Fault Lines Daily Summary - July 1, 2026
Daily news and analysis tracking the cracks and shifts at the fault lines of global power — with Korea at the epicenter.
🔎 Surface Scan
Lee Jae Myung’s government is trying to convert record chip exports, alliance cooperation, and revived progressive diplomacy into a larger capacity-building agenda, but the hardest problems are execution and control. Seoul is pushing OPCON transfer and deeper defense-industrial cooperation with Washington, yet the same agenda still depends on U.S. approvals, congressional language, intelligence-sharing confidence, and alliance politics. Lee is also restoring a progressive peace architecture toward North Korea, but Pyongyang’s hostile turn may predate the Yoon policies Lee is trying to reverse, making North Korean reciprocity far from assured. The chip boom gives Seoul powerful economic momentum, but the government’s semiconductor and AI megaprojects now face hard constraints in power, water, talent, permitting, corporate buy-in, regional politics, and Hormuz-linked supply exposure. Regionally, Kim Jong Un is courting Beijing while keeping Moscow central, and Japan-South Korea defense cooperation is advancing only as fast as South Korean domestic politics will allow. Globally, Ukraine’s attacks are exposing Russian fuel vulnerabilities while Hormuz risks are easing for Korean vessels without producing a settled transit regime. The day’s central tension is that Seoul has more ambition and more assets than before, but many of the decisive variables sit with Washington, Pyongyang, Samsung and SK, infrastructure systems, global markets, and conflict zones far from the peninsula.
🇰🇷 Epicenter
Summary:
• OPCON and Seoul’s alliance-based autonomy push. The defense ministry reviewed progress toward completing full operational capability verification this year as Seoul tries to accelerate wartime OPCON transfer within Lee Jae Myung’s term, while also preparing a road map with Washington before the annual Security Consultative Meeting in October. That review came as the ministry also addressed concerns over whether Seoul’s ability to track North Korea’s recent missile activity may have been hampered by U.S. intelligence-sharing limits; the ministry pushed back, saying South Korean and U.S. forces detected and tracked the June 25 launches in real time and that the issue should not be politicized. Hankyoreh, a left-leaning outlet broadly sympathetic to the progressive case for OPCON transfer and critical of U.S. adherence to capabilities-based milestones rather than political deadlines, pushed back against claims that OPCON transfer would automatically end U.S. extended deterrence or trigger U.S. troop withdrawal, arguing instead that U.S. nuclear decision-making and USFK posture would remain driven by Washington’s own strategic calculations, especially China and Indo-Pacific force posture. In another analysis, Hankyoreh presented alleged friction between USFK Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson and Seoul partly as U.S. pressure to reorient the alliance toward China and partly as personal-career incentive, a more speculative interpretation that should be read as commentary rather than official reporting. That creates a more complicated autonomy bargain for Seoul: OPCON transfer is framed as reclaiming wartime command authority, while many of the capabilities Seoul wants next — nuclear technology, nuclear-powered submarine discussions, shipbuilding, and advanced defense-industrial cooperation — still require U.S. consent, U.S. law, or U.S. political support. The Korea Times shipbuilding piece illustrates the problem in one lane: Washington may want Korean yards to help solve U.S. naval-capacity shortages, but U.S. congressional language could still limit the role Korean firms are allowed to play.
Sources: Yonhap — Defense ministry reviews progress on conditions for OPCON transfer; Yonhap — S. Korea says closely coordinates with U.S. after belated disclosure of N.K. missile launch; Hankyoreh — Will the US really stop providing extended deterrence if Seoul regains OPCON?; Hankyoreh — No, Seoul regaining OPCON won’t necessarily trigger a US troop withdrawal; Hankyoreh — Why does the USFK commander keep butting heads with Seoul?; Yonhap— FM says nuclear, tech cooperation will bring greater benefits to S. Korea-U.S. alliance; Korea Times — New risks lurk for Korea-US shipbuilding partnership
• Lee pushes progressive peace policy while the causes of North Korea’s hostility remain contested. Lee told the Peaceful Unification Advisory Council that South Korea must keep trying to replace the Korean War armistice with a peace regime, pledging peaceful coexistence, respect for North Korea’s system and sovereignty, and continued efforts to “knock” on Pyongyang’s closed door despite North Korea’s refusal to respond. In his lunch with Moon Jae-in at Cheong Wa Dae, Lee said he would revive elements of the Sunshine Policy and Moon-era peace process, linking the effort to a broader restoration of policies he said were damaged under Yoon Suk Yeol. The PUAC’s addition of 2,176 advisers, bringing the body to a record 25,000 members, gives that peace-and-consensus agenda a larger domestic and overseas advisory apparatus. Korea JoongAng Daily complicates the progressive account that Pyongyang’s hostility was mainly a reaction to Yoon, arguing with big-data analysis that Kim Jong Un’s shift began after the 2019 Hanoi summit collapse and hardened before Yoon’s presidency. Lee is attempting to restore the familiar progressive peace architecture, but that case now has to account for a North Korean hostile two-state turn that cannot be explained only as a reaction to conservative policy in Seoul.
Sources: Korea Times / Yonhap — President Lee vows continued efforts to replace inter-Korean armistice with peace regime; Korea Herald — Lee vows to revive policy of reconciliation with N. Korea; Yonhap — Presidential unification body adds over 2,000 advisers, plans overseas expansion; Korea JoongAng Daily — Progressives blame Yoon Suk Yeol for North Korea's hostility. But the enmity goes back further.
• AI chips put Korea in the $100 billion monthly export club. South Korea’s June exports rose 70.9 percent from a year earlier to a record $102.25 billion, the strongest growth since 1978 and the first time the country has passed $100 billion in monthly exports. Semiconductor exports nearly tripled to $44.82 billion, computer exports surged on AI-infrastructure demand, and the trade surplus reached a record $36.15 billion. Korea Herald and Korea JoongAng Daily stressed the global milestone: South Korea became only the fourth country to cross the $100 billion monthly export threshold, after Germany, China, and the United States. WSJ added two useful cautions: the June figure beat economist forecasts, but the gains were uneven, with AI-linked sectors booming while nontech industries continued to face raw-material, logistics, and Middle East-related pressures. The export surge therefore gives Lee’s mega-project push a strong factual backdrop, but it also shows how much of Korea’s current upside is concentrated in one AI-linked industrial cycle.
Sources: Wall Street Journal — South Korea’s Exports Surge by Most Since 1978 on Red-Hot Demand for Chips; Reuters — South Korea exports post strongest growth since 1978 on AI chip boom; Yonhap — (3rd LD) S. Korea’s monthly exports hit US$100 bln for 1st time in June; Korea JoongAng Daily — Korea becomes fourth nation to top $100 billion in monthly exports as chip shipments hit record high; Korea Herald — Chip boom drives S. Korea into $100b monthly export club
• Lee turns the chip boom into a state-led regional-industrial bet. Lee’s three megaprojects — semiconductors, physical AI, and AI data centers — put the presidency, local governments, Samsung, SK, the National Growth Fund, and regional political actors into one industrial-policy campaign built around speed, infrastructure, and regional development. Samsung and SK hynix are expected to build four new memory fabs in Gwangju and the broader southwest, with corporate investment around 800 trillion won; related plans include HBM packaging in Chungcheong, Samsung’s broader 2,655 trillion won domestic investment plan, SK Group’s AI-infrastructure commitments, and National Growth Fund scaling for physical AI. Lee, his chief of staff Kang Hoon-sik, and local figures such as Min Hyeong-bae framed the investments as a way to break the capital-region development model, turn Honam into a new growth base, and move permits and infrastructure at “super-fast” speed. Dong-A’s “direct control” framing captures the political center of gravity: Lee is not just endorsing the project, but tying presidential authority to its execution. The risks are substantial as well: Yonhap, Reuters, The Korea Times, Korea JoongAng Daily, and Chosun all flagged uncertainty over timelines, corporate pressure, AI-cycle assumptions, water, talent, power, transmission, land, and permitting. Chosun adds the sharpest energy critique, reporting that the projects could require power equivalent to 20 reactors and that industry leaders are calling for nuclear and LNG backup even as Lee inspected renewable-energy sites. The politics are also awkward: opposition lawmakers and a civic group accused the government of steering or pressuring Samsung and SK into regional commitments, while a separate profit-sharing debate forced the government to deny rumors of a think tank to use chipmakers’ “huge profits.” Former Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Kritenbrink added an external-risk angle, calling for South Korea to diversify specialty-gas supplies for its chip sector amid Hormuz disruptions, which connects the mega-project push to energy security and shipping exposure rather than just domestic industrial policy.
Sources: Yonhap — (3rd LD) Lee vows to secure chip, AI supremacy through large-scale investment; Hankyoreh — Lee bets big on 3 ‘megaprojects’ to make Korea unrivaled chip, AI powerhouse; Dong-A Ilbo — Lee takes direct control of chip project; Reuters — Key facts on South Korea's three chip and AI 'mega projects'; Yonhap — Lee says large-scale investment needed to secure 'overwhelming' chip supply capability; Yonhap — (News Focus) S. Korea's ambitious chip plan raises questions over execution, infrastructure challenges; Herald Corp. — Kang Hoon-sik calls semiconductor mega-project investments 'first steps' toward regional growth; Korea Times — New PM vows to fast-track Korea's AI push on 1st day in office; Yonhap — (LEAD) Lee says gov't will actively support chip cluster project in southwest; Yonhap — (2nd LD) S. Korea to build semiconductor cluster in southwest with 800 tln won in corporate investment; Yonhap — (LEAD) Samsung, SK hynix to unveil investment plans this week: presidential office; Reuters — Korea taps Samsung, SK Hynix in $576 billion AI-chip drive to cement global leadership; Yonhap — (LEAD) Samsung, SK eye 896 tln-won investment in southwest region amid gov't drive; Reuters — Samsung Electronics, SK Hynix to invest in two new fabrication sites in South Korea, government says; Yonhap — (LEAD) Samsung to invest 2,655 tln won under gov't drive to promote regional development; Yonhap — (LEAD) SK Group to invest 2,100 tln won to secure AI infrastructure nationwide; Korea JoongAng Daily — Samsung, SK hynix commit $520B for four new chip plants, but major details remain unclear; Herald Corp. — Min Hyeong-bae welcomes 800 trillion won semiconductor investment in southwest Korea; Yonhap — Samsung weighs new chip plant in southwestern city of Gwangju; Korea Herald — Lee calls Samsung, SK chiefs 'national heroes' in W900tr chip push; Yonhap — National Growth Fund to scale up investment in physical AI sector; Korea Times — Lee's southwestern semiconductor cluster draws corporate arm-twisting accusations; Korea JoongAng Daily — With $500B set to flood into chip hub, Samsung and SK hynix face water and talent shortage; Korea JoongAng Daily — Lee’s chip investment push for southwest Korea triggers clash over water, politics and regional development; Chosun Ilbo — Semiconductor, AI Projects Require Power of 20 Reactors; Chosun Ilbo — President Lee Inspects Renewables; Industry Pushes Nuclear; Reuters — Samsung, SK Hynix mega South Korea chips gamble tests optimism of AI cycle; Korea Times — Samsung, SK chip investment timelines leave room for adjustment; Korea Times— Chipmakers face pressure to share ‘excess profits’ despite investment pledge; Yonhap — Gov't denies rumors over new think tank on utilizing chipmakers' huge profits; Yonhap — Ex-U.S. official calls for diversification strategy for S. Korea's chip sector amid Hormuz disruptions
• U.S. lawmakers frame Korean tech regulation as protectionism. A U.S. House Judiciary Committee report accused South Korea of discriminatory treatment of Coupang and other U.S. firms, arguing that Korean investigations, fines, and regulatory demands violate last year’s bilateral trade agreement and create barriers for American digital companies. CNBC’s report and the New York Post’s account add the most aggressive version of that allegation, describing Coupang’s data-breach response, claimed National Intelligence Service pressure, a laptop-recovery operation in China, threatened criminal charges, travel-ban concerns, and a broader U.S. argument that South Korean digital regulation has become protectionist. Those claims should be attributed carefully: they come from the House report, Coupang-linked testimony, and U.S. commentary, while South Korean authorities have denied key parts of the NIS account. Separately, South Korea’s Fair Trade Commission launched a review alleging Google abused its Android app-store position by pressuring game companies not to release titles on rival platform One Store, with Korea JoongAng Daily reporting that the possible fine could reach 850 billion won. Korea JoongAng Daily also reported Samsung’s denial of U.S. price-fixing allegations over memory prices, placing Korean tech firms and U.S. legal exposure on the other side of the same regulatory map. The sharper tension is that Seoul wants deeper U.S. cooperation in strategic technology, AI, shipbuilding, and advanced industry, while U.S. lawmakers are now portraying South Korea’s platform, data, and competition enforcement as protectionist treatment of American firms.
Sources: Yonhap — House committee issues report accusing S. Korea of 'discriminatory attacks' on Coupang, other U.S. firms; CNBC — South Korean government discriminated against Coupang, U.S. companies, House report finds; New York Post — US-based ‘Amazon of South Korea’ forced to recover laptop from bottom of Chinese river in bizarre data privacy clampdown: report ; Yonhap — (LEAD) Watchdog launches review on Google's alleged fair trade violation; Reuters — South Korean trade watchdog alleges Google abused its position in Android app store; Korea JoongAng Daily — Google could face up to 850 billion won fine over allegedly coercing game companies; Korea JoongAng Daily — Exclusive: Samsung calls U.S. price-fixing allegations 'unfounded' amid climbing memory prices
Impact:
Seoul’s agenda is ambitious, but execution depends on variables it cannot control. The OPCON review, nuclear-technology discussions, nuclear-powered submarine ambitions, shipbuilding cooperation, and defense-industrial initiatives all advance Seoul’s capacity-building agenda, but each requires some combination of U.S. approval, legal accommodation, intelligence-sharing confidence, or congressional support. Lee’s peace-policy push faces different constraints: he can restore the Sunshine-policy lineage, expand the unification advisory machinery, and offer nonaggression language, but Pyongyang decides whether any of that becomes diplomacy — and the Korea JoongAng Daily analysis suggests Kim Jong Un’s hostile two-state turn cannot be attributed simply to Yoon-era policies. The export surge gives the administration a strong economic foundation for the semiconductor and AI mega-projects, but the planned buildout depends on Samsung and SK, reliable power and water, engineers, permits, regional buy-in, and specialty-gas logistics exposed to Hormuz risk. The platform-regulation disputes add a U.S. market-access problem to the same domestic technology agenda: Korean regulators are pursuing Coupang, Google, and competition/data cases, while U.S. lawmakers are recasting those actions as protectionism against American firms. The policy challenge for Seoul is not choosing between sovereignty and alliance cooperation, or between government direction and corporate execution; it is aligning U.S. approvals, Korean firms, infrastructure buildout, and Pyongyang-facing diplomacy well enough for Lee’s agenda to produce real defense, industrial, and diplomatic outcomes.
🌏 Shifting Plates
Summary:
• Kim courts China from inside a Moscow-Beijing triangle. Kim Jong Un marked the Chinese Communist Party’s 105th anniversary with a message to Xi Jinping pledging to deepen North Korea-China ties, recalling Xi’s June visit to Pyongyang and framing party-to-party cooperation as the guarantee of the relationship. Korea JoongAng Daily treated the message as part of a broader North Korean effort to lean harder into China as U.S.-China rivalry deepens, while its separate analysis argued that Kim’s posture toward Xi and Putin has shifted from deference to strategic equality after the Hanoi summit collapse and the deepening of North Korea-Russia ties. Yonhap, Al Jazeera and Anadolu all reported the same core message: Pyongyang is publicly reaffirming China ties even as Kim’s partnership with Putin gives him a second great-power channel. The photo display outside North Korea’s embassy in Beijing adds a dynastic layer, with more images of Kim’s daughter appearing alongside him on a board that Pyongyang uses to shape how it wants to be seen abroad. Separately, a report co-published by Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights and Data Desk found that commercial vessel activity at five major North Korean ports has jumped fivefold since 2019, with large gaps between satellite sightings and AIS records pointing to possible sanctions evasion and illicit coal trade.
Sources: Korea JoongAng Daily — Vassal no more: Kim Jong-un’s body language with Xi, Putin says he’s one of the big boys now; Korea JoongAng Daily — North Korea signals push for closer ties with China with Kim’s congratulatory message to Xi; Yonhap — N. Korea’s Kim vows strong ties with China on founding anniv. of Chinese Communist Party; Al Jazeera — North Korea’s Kim hails ‘unshakeable will’ to develop ties with China’s Xi; Anadolu Agency — North Korea’s Kim reiterates commitment to strengthen ties with China; Yonhap — Photo display of N. Korean Embassy in Beijing features more photos of leader Kim’s daughter; Yonhap — N. Korea’s port activity jumps fivefold since 2019, suggesting illicit coal trade: report
• Regional military networks harden while Seoul and Tokyo move cautiously. Japan is trying to build trust with South Korea after the latest defense ministerial meeting, with Tokyo interested in an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement that would allow mutual provision of supplies such as fuel and food in a crisis, but Yomiuri reported that South Korean domestic politics make rapid progress unlikely. North Korea attacked Japan-U.S. Resolute Dragon drills as a “war rehearsal,” while Dong-A reported that China expanded dual-use export controls on Japanese defense-linked entities as part of a continuing campaign against Tokyo’s military buildup. South Korea, meanwhile, is participating more visibly in U.S.-led and regional military settings: its Navy is serving as maritime component commander at RIMPAC, the first Asian navy to hold that role, and its Marine Corps joined the KAMANDAG exercise in the Philippines with the United States, Japan and the Philippines. On the other side of the regional map, Reuters reported that Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov approved sending Russian military personnel to People’s Liberation Army facilities in China for secret training, including radiological, chemical and biological protection, while a separate Reuters report said the North Korea-Russia road bridge appears delayed because Russian-side facilities remain unfinished. The result is a mixed regional picture: U.S.-aligned military cooperation is becoming more operational, but Japan-South Korea cooperation still faces political limits, and China, Russia and North Korea are tightening or testing their own channels with uneven execution.
Sources: Yomiuri / The Japan News — Japan Aims to Lay Groundwork for Stronger Security Cooperation with S. Korea; Yonhap — N. Korea slams Japan-U.S. military drills as ‘war rehearsal’; Dong-A Ilbo — China expands curbs over Japan’s military buildup; Yonhap — Navy chief to visit Hawaii this week for RIMPAC exercise; Yonhap — S. Korea’s Marine Corps participates in annual multinational exercise in Philippines; Reuters — Russia approved secret China military training at top level, sources say; Reuters — Opening of North Korea-Russia road bridge likely delayed, US think tank says
Impact:
Seoul’s regional problem is no longer only North Korea; it is how North Korea now fits into a wider alignment map. Kim is trying to show that he can deepen China ties without returning to a subordinate posture, while Russia gives Pyongyang additional diplomatic, military and logistical leverage. That leaves Seoul facing a North Korea that is more confident externally, more visible in dynastic messaging, and still able to exploit sanctions-enforcement gaps at sea. Japan-South Korea defense cooperation is becoming more necessary as China, Russia, and North Korea each deepen or test military, political, and logistical channels around the region, but Yomiuri’s ACSA reporting shows why Seoul still has to manage domestic skepticism toward Japan and toward tighter U.S.-Japan-South Korea military integration. South Korea’s participation in RIMPAC and KAMANDAG shows that practical security cooperation is moving ahead even where formal bilateral arrangements remain politically sensitive. The delayed North Korea-Russia bridge is a reminder that the alignment has coordination problems of its own, but the direction is still clear: Pyongyang is building more channels to China and Russia while Seoul, Tokyo and Washington test how much regional security cooperation South Korean politics will sustain.
🌍 Global Ripples
Summary:
• Ukraine’s strikes expose Russian fuel vulnerability. Ukraine is escalating attacks inside Russia, including drone and missile strikes on Moscow, Crimea, oil refineries, communications infrastructure, and other targets, in an effort to make the war more visible and costly for ordinary Russians. The New York Times frames the campaign as a new phase of the war: Kyiv is trying to pressure Vladimir Putin by bringing disruption to Russian territory, but Putin has so far responded with defiance rather than concessions. The Hill reported that Zelensky warned Russia was preparing a massive strike against Ukraine even as Kyiv continued long-range attacks, including a drone strike on the Dubna Satellite Communications Centre near Moscow. Korea Times, carrying Reuters, added the economic evidence of strain: Russia has begun seaborne gasoline imports from India to ease shortages caused by Ukrainian strikes on energy infrastructure, with fuel rationing, queues, and rising gasoline prices spreading across Russian regions. The campaign is not yet forcing Putin toward a settlement, but it is widening the war’s economic effects inside Russia and making fuel logistics a more visible pressure point.
Sources: New York Times — Ukraine Takes the War to Russia; The Hill — Zelensky warns of massive Russian strike planned for Ukraine; Korea Times / Reuters — Russia buys gasoline from India to tackle shortages, sources say
• Hormuz relief arrives before the waterway is settled. Iran is insisting on international recognition of its control over the Strait of Hormuz, including routing authority and possible future fees, even after agreeing under an interim U.S.-Iran arrangement to let ships pass without charge for 60 days. Reuters reported that Iranian sources say Tehran will not move to other peace-talk issues until its Hormuz control claims are addressed, and that Iran fired on four ships over the weekend that tried to transit without Iranian permission. South Korea is getting practical relief: one more South Korean-operated vessel exited the strait, leaving only two South Korea-linked ships in the Persian Gulf, including the damaged HMM Namu, which Reuters said is expected to leave in mid-July at the earliest once repairs are complete. Seoul also plans to lower its crude-oil resource security alert by one notch and lift the natural-gas alert, citing stabilized oil prices and partial resumption of tanker movement. But the industry ministry said passage uncertainty has not fully disappeared and kept some safeguards in place, including a ban on hoarding raw materials for petrochemical products.
Sources: Reuters — Iran insists on keeping control over Hormuz, senior Iranian sources say; Yonhap — 1 more S. Korean vessel exits Strait of Hormuz; Yonhap — (2nd LD) Gov’t to lower energy security alert on crude by notch amid eased uncertainties; Reuters — South Korea cargo ship Namu to exit Strait of Hormuz after attack in Gulf
Impact:
Korea’s global exposure is easing in some places but hardening in others. Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign is making Russia’s fuel system more vulnerable, with consequences for Seoul because the war continues to affect energy flows, sanctions enforcement, Russian military staying power, and the strategic value Moscow places on external partners such as North Korea. Hormuz presents the opposite pattern: South Korean vessels are gradually clearing the strait and Seoul is lowering its crude alert, but Iran’s demand for control, routing authority, and future fees means the waterway remains a legal, military, and commercial risk rather than a normalized transit route. For Korean industry, these developments point to a shared exposure: energy and shipping disruptions can move from distant conflicts into fuel prices, refinery planning, petrochemical inputs, vessel safety, and chip-sector supply chains. Seoul can adjust alerts, diversify crude routes, and support stranded ships, but it cannot decide whether domestic fuel pain changes Putin’s war calculus, whether Russia escalates against Ukraine, or whether Iran and Washington settle Hormuz rules. The practical lesson for Korea is not that every global shock becomes a crisis at home; it is that export-led growth, semiconductor expansion, and energy security all depend on logistics systems that remain vulnerable to wars far from the peninsula.
🔗 Convergence
The common thread across Lee’s agenda is dependence on actors and systems Seoul can influence and attempt to shape, but not control. OPCON transfer, nuclear-technology cooperation, nuclear-powered submarine discussions, shipbuilding, and defense-industrial cooperation all support a stronger Korean defense posture, but they still require U.S. political, legal, and operational cooperation. Similarly, the industrial lane depends on coordination beyond Seoul’s full control: record chip exports strengthen the case for the semiconductor and AI mega-projects, yet Samsung and SK must commit capital, local governments must deliver sites and permits, engineers and water must be available, and power supply has to match the scale of the plan. Lee’s North Korea policy adds a diplomatic version of the same constraint; Seoul can restore progressive peace language and advisory machinery, but Pyongyang’s choices will determine whether that becomes a negotiating track or remains a South Korean posture. The U.S. tech dispute sharpens the alliance-economic risk because Washington is being asked to cooperate on strategic technology and industry while some U.S. lawmakers accuse Seoul of protecting its digital market through platform, data, and competition enforcement. Regional and global developments reinforce the same lesson: Kim is using both China and Russia to improve Pyongyang’s position, Ukraine is pushing Russia’s fuel system under stress, and Hormuz remains a transit problem even as Korean vessels begin to clear the strait. Seoul has real leverage in chips, shipbuilding, defense modernization, and diplomacy, but the next stage of Lee’s agenda will depend on whether those assets can be coordinated with partners, companies, infrastructure systems, and adversaries that do not move on Seoul’s timetable.